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acquired title from a stranger or has acquired the landlord's title before
entering into possession under the lease, he is held to have a paramount
title.9 It has been argued that when the tenant acquires the lessor's title
on a charge existing prior to the time of the lease, the tenant acquires a
paramount title and should be estopped to assert it; but if he acquires the
lessor's title on a charge arising after the lease, he does not, by asserting
it, deny his landlord's tite.lO The cases, however, do not recognize the
distinction, but distinguish only between acquisition of the landlord's title
before or after the tenancy commenced.11
The question presented by this case is rather novel in that it does not
fall clearly within any well-defined class of cases to which the general rule
is applied or to which an exception to the general rule is recognized. In
the principal case, the landlord, at the time the tenant entered into posses-
sion under the lease, held a title which was defeasible only by the tenant.
While it would seem that the tenant, in exercising or enforcing the de-
feasance, is not denying his landlord's title or asserting a paramount title
but is rather affirming and asserting his landlord's title, there is some
conflict among the authorities as to the right of the tenant to acquire and
assert against the landlord a title or interest based on the enforcement of
such a defeasance.12 Some of these cases have been reconciled on the
ground that the tenant is estopped only in actions based on the lease or
the right of possession, but is not estopped in actions in which title is
directly involved.13 Under this view, it is apparent that the principal
case was correctly decided, for the landlord himself has put his title in
issue by bringing an action to quiet title. While all the cases cannot be
rationalized in this manner, it would seem that the court in this case
chose the better view if the reason for the general rule is to prevent the
tenant from making use of the possession under his lease in asserting a
title adverse to or paramount to that of his landlord.14 0. M. B.
NEGLIGENCE-REs IPSA LOQTJITUR-APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE--Ac-
tion to recover for the death of James Wilkins who had been employed by
the appellant railroad company as a car inspector. The complaint alleges
that the appellant was assembling two trains on the same track, that were
bound in opposite directions, and that the cabooses of sand trains were
coupled together. It was the duty of the said Wilkins, as car inspector, to
inspect the brakes of all outgoing trains. While so engaged in testing
the brakes of the east-bound train, and pursuant and under the direction
of the proper signal from the engineer, the deceased stepped between the
cabooses for the purpose of releasing the angle cock, preparatory to the
brake test. While the deceased was engaged in the performance of this
'Bowser v. Bowser (1847), 27 Tenn. 23; Smith v. Crosland (1884), 106 Pa. 413.
"0Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, p. 496.
"Bowser v. Bowser, supra, note 9; Smith v. Crosland, supra, note 9.
"2Pierce v. Brown (1852), 24 Vt. 165; Mattis v. Robinson (1871), 1 Neb. 3, in
which the court cites and disapproves Pierce v. Brown, supra; Niles v. Ransford
(1849), 1 Mich. 338, 51 Am. Dec. 95; Stout v. Merrill (1872), 35 Iowa 47. But see
MoLeod v. Sharp (1893), 53 Il1. App. 406; Howard v. Jones (1899), 123 Ala. 488,
26 So. 129.
' 35 Corpus Juris 1232, sec. 575.
"Houston v. Farris (1882), 71 Ala. 570.
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task, the appellant made a flying switch of a cut of cars, and kicked them
against the cars to the west of the cabooses with unnecessary violence and
great force, and without any warning whatsoever to the deceased, who was
thereby caught, crushed, and injured through the abdomen, causing his
death. The appellant demurred on ground that the complaint did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Overruled. Verdict for
plaintiff. The appellant assigned error for overruling the demurrer. Held,
no error, res ipsct loquitur applicable.1
The decision is unquestionably in accord with the great majority of
cases upon this doctrine. The term res ipsa loquitur literally means "the
thing speaks for itself." The court states the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to be this: that where an accident happens resulting in injury to a person
or his property, and it is made to appear that all the instrumentalities
causing the accident were under the exclusive control and management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as would not
ordinarily occur if due care had been exercised by those who had control
of such instrumentalities, and the duty to exercise such due care is owing
to the injured party from the defendant, then those facts afford reasonable
evidence in absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from the want of due care.2
The doctrine is predicated upon the superior knowledge of the defendant
as to the cause of the injury under the peculiar circumstances involved,
and his failure to explain. Since the plaintiff is in no position to show
the particular circumstances, the defendant, possessing superior knowledge
or means of informing as to the accident and its cause, should therefore
be required to produce explanation. 3
The application of the rule originates from the nature of the act done,
and not from the relation existing between the parties to such act. Where
the necessary facts appear, such as where the defendant has exclusive
management and control over the instrumentality by which the injury was
inflicted, etc., the rule may be invoked both where the parties stand in
certain relationships to each other, such as master-servant, carrier-pas-
senger; or where the parties stand in no relation to each other, as where
one is lawfully in a place, as a passerby in the street, and is injured by the
negligent conduct of another. 4
I Southern By. Co. v. Wilkins, Appellate Court of Indiana, Nov. 19, 1931, 178
N. E. 454.2 Knoefel v. Atkins (1907), 40 Ind. App. 428, 81 N. E. 600; Cleveland, etc. By.
Co. v. Hadley (1907), 170 Ind. 204, 84 N. E. 13; City of Decatur v. Eady (1917),
186 Ind. 205, 115 N. E. 577; Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hoffman (1914), 57 Ind.
App. 431, 107 N. E. 315; Sweeney v. Erving (1913), 228 U S. 233, 33 S. Ct. 416;
Plumb v. Richmond Light Co. (1922), 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504; O'Neil v.
Toomey (1914), 218 Mass. 242, 105 N. E. 974; McClure v. Hoopeston (1922), 303
Ill. 89, 135 N. E. 43; Jones v. Bland (1921), 182 N. C. 70, 108 S. E. 344; Connor V.
Atchinson, etc. By. Co. (1922), 189 Cal. 1, 207 Pac. 378; Chenall v. Palmer Brick
Co. (1903), 147 Ky. 349, 144 S. W. 11; Brawley v. Toronto Ry. Co., 46 Ont. L. Rep.
31, 6 British Rule Cas. 685.
'Prest-o-Lite Co. v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365; Looney v. Prest-
o-Lite (1917), 65 Ind. App. 617, 117 N. E. 678; Delaware, etc. By. Co. v. Dix
(1911), 188 Fed. 901, 110 C. C. A. 535.
'Pittsburgh, etc. By. Co. v. Hoffman (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431, 107 N. E. 315;
Delaware, etc. By. Co. v. Dix (1911), 188 Fed. 901, 110 C. C. A. 535; Wardman v.
Hanlon (1922), 280 Fed. 988, 52 App. Cas. D. C. 14; Marceau v. Rutland (1914),
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Although relationship is not a requisite to the application of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, it makes it convenient to classify the factual
situations under which the doctrine has been invoked into such relational
categories.
First under the relation of master and servant the doctrine of res ips
loquitur has been held applicable; where the deceased, a fireman on appel-
lant's engine, was killed when the engine suddenly broke down and left
the tracks.5 Where the appellee, who was repairing the appellant's eleva-
tor, was injured by the falling of the elevator while it was under the control
and management of the appellant.6 Where the appellee was injured by
the falling of a scaffold that had been built by the appellant, for the use
of the appellee in repairing the appellant's hopper. 7 Where the appellant's
train passing over a partly completed bridge at a rapid speed dropped a
lump of coal from the tender, which struck the appellee, who was engaged
in his duties as watchman below the tracks.8 Where a defective brake
failed to stop a switched car resulting in the injury of the switchman.9
Where a brakeman in the employ of the appellant was injured in a collision
due to the failure of the appellant's crew to comply with signals given.10
Where an employe was injured by the explosion of a boiler.11 Where an
employee was injured by explosion of dynamite in a powder factory.12
Second under the relation of merchant and customer the doctrine has
been applied where a druggist dispenses poison to a customer who asked
for a harmless remedy, and as a result the person suffered injury.13
Where the appellant supplied electricity to the homes in a city for lighting
purposes, and the deceased was killed while adjusting an incandescent
light, due to the fact that the wires to his home had been overcharged.14
Where a customer fell through a trap door, that had been left open.15
Also the doctrine has been applied in a few states in cases of sale and
manufacture of articles, which in their natural form would be harmless,
but due to some negligence were rendered injurious.16
Under the category of carrier and passenger there has been a wide
application of the doctrine. Res ipsa loquitur was held to be applicable
where a passenger in an elevator was injured by its fall.17 There is a
211 N. Y. 203, 105 N. E. 206; Rose v. Stephens Transp. Co. (1882). 11 Fed. 438, 20
Blackf. 411; McCray v. Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. (1896), 89 Tex. 168, 34 S. W. 95;
Chiles v. Ft. Smith Comm. Co. (1919), 139 Ark. 489, 216 S. W. 11; 20 R. C. L.,
p. 187.
B. & 0. Southwestern R. B. Co. v. Hill (1925), 84 Ind. App. 354, 148 N. E. 489.
OArtificial Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Waltz (1927), 86 Ind. App. 826, 156
N. E. 534.
Talge Mahogany Co. v. Hackett (1914), 55 Ind. App. 303, 103 N. E. 815.
'Pittsburgh, etc. By. Co. v. Hoffman (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431, 107 N. E. 315.
9Pennsylvania B. R. Co. v. Hough (1928), 88 Ind. App. 501, 161 N. E. 705.
" Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co. v. Turner (1918), 69 Ind. App. 101, 121 N. E. 295.
%'Harris v. Mangum (1922), 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177.
5 Judson v. Giant Powder Co. (1895), 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020.
3Knoefel v. Atkins (1907), 40 Ind. App. 428, 81 N. E. 600; Brown v. Marshall
(1882), 47 Mich. 576.
*San Juan Light Co. v. Requena (1911), 224 U. S. 89.
'Gallagher v. Halpern (1916), 159 N. Y. S. 160.
"Lamb v. Boyles (1926), 192 N. C. 542, 135 S. E. 464: Rosenswaike v. Inter-
borough Transit Co. (1919), 175 N. Y. 828.
7Springer v. Ford (1901), 189 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. 953.
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large group of cases that apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases
where a passenger on a common carrier is injured by machinery, appli-
ances, and other instrumentalities that are within the exclusive control
and management of the carrier.1S
Aside from the above cases where there was some relation between the
parties, the doctrine has been applied in cases where there is no relation-
ship between the parties, as where one who is lawfully in a public street
is injured by falling objects, obstructoins, openings, etc., that are wholly
within the control of the defendant. The following cases are examples of
such applications: where a passerby fell into an open coal hole on defend-
ant's sidewalk.19 Where a pedestrian was injured by objects falling upon
him from adjoining property such as an electric sign; 2 0 portion of a wall
of building;22 snow and ice from roof; 2 3 objects of merchandise, such as
barrels; 2 4 and where a traveler in the street stepped on fallen high voltage
wires of the defendant's lines and was injured, the doctrine was held to be
applicable.25 A. C. J.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS--FMLLING BLAINKS-COGNOViT NOTE-On or
about August 24, 1927, in pursuance of carrying out a contract of sale of
real estate located in the city of South Bend, Indiana, defendants gave to
plaintiff, both parties residents of Indiana, a note as part payment of the
purchase price. This note had the following clause with the blanks indi-
cated: " hereby authorizes any Attorney at Law to appear in any
Court of Record in the United States, after the above obligation becomes
due, and waive the issuing and service of process and confess a judgment
against - in favor of the holder." Plaintiff sues on this note. By
statute in Indiana the enforcement of a cognovit note is a misdemeanor.
Held, the note is not a cognovit note.1
This decision turns in part upon the recent cognovit note statutes. 2
I' Union Traction Co. v. Berry (1919), 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655; Feldman v.
Chicago Rys. Co. (1919), 289 Ill. 25, 124 N. n. 334; Mansfield Public Utility Co. V.
Grogg (1921), 103 Ohio 418, 132 N. E. 481; Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. R. Co.
(1918), 52 Utah 84, 172 Paa. 680; Hughes -v. Atlantic City & S. R. Co. (1914), 85
N. J. L..212, 89 AUt. 769; Norfolk, etc. Ry. Co. v. Birchett (1918), 252 Fed. 512.
19 Gillis v. Cambridge Gaslight Co. (1909), 202 Mass. 222, 88 N. E. 779.
"'Excelsior Blec. Co. v. Sweet (1894), 57 N. J. L. 224, 30 Atl. 553.
2 Scheller v. Silbermintz (1906), 98 N. Y. S. 230, 50 Misc. 175;Kearner v. C. S.
Tourner Co. (1910), 31 R. I. 203, 76 Atl. 833.
2Kearney v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, 19 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 1; Brown v. Bryant (1911), 166 Mich. 18, 131 N. W. 577; McNamara v. Boston
& M. R. Co. (1909), 202 Mass. 491, 89 N. E. 131; Connolly v. Des Moines Invest.
Co. (1905), 130 Iowa 633, 105 N. W. 400; Hughes v. Harbor, etc. Savings Assoc.
(1909), 115 N. Y. S. 320.
3Shephard v. Creamer (1894), 160 Mass. 496, 36 N. E. 475.
2Byrne v. Boadle (1863), 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Repr. 299; Lowner v. New
York, etc. R. Co. (1900), 175 Mass. 166, 55 N. E. 805.
0 Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co. (1897), 43 W. Va. 661, 28 S. E. 733.
'Fodor v. Pott, Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 9, 1931, 178 N. E. 695.
sActs 1927, page 656; Sec. 640, 3 Burns 1929 Supplement: "Any negotiable
instrument, or other written contract to pay money, which contains any provision or
stipulation giving to any person or power of attorney, or authority as attorney, for
the maker, or any indorser, or assignor, or other person liable thereon, and in the
name of such maker, indorser, assignor, or other obligor to appear in any court,
whether of record or inferior, or to waive the issuance or personal service of process
in any action to enforce payment of the money, or any part claimed to be due
